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ON THE CAUSAL IRREDUCIBILITY OF NATURAL FUNCTION STATEMENTS 
ERIC RUSSERT KRAEMER 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
One topic of interest to a number of philosophers of science is 
whether functional explanation can be reduced to some other kind of 
explanation, such as causal explanation. Some philosophers have tried 
to reduce talk of natural functions to talk of causes. I here examine 
some such attempts and try to provide, in addition to the traditional 
CQunter-examples, an argument as to why such reductions should fail. 
Certain parallels are drawn between attributions of natural functions to 
parts of organisms and attributions of propositional attitudes to per-
sons. 
t t t 
The complexity of the activities of living organisms has 
impressed most students of biology. Certain biologists and 
philosophers have proceeded to argue that organic life exhibits 
such unusual traits that if we are to understand organic phe-
nomena adequately we must postulate some kind of special, 
non-standardly-physical entity in virtue of which biological 
activity occurs_ Hans Driesch, for example, has spoken of 
entelechies (I 927). Other philosophers and biologists, while 
not wishing to share Driesch's enthusiasm for postulating a 
special entity, have still argued that there are certain char-
acteristic features of organic phenomena which make the 
project of giving a wholly adequate explanation of biology in 
terms of physics and chemistry seem an unlikely prospect. 
What I shall be concerned with here is one such feature, 
namely, functional explanation. By functional explanation I 
mean explanations of the occurrence of some trait in an or-
ganism in terms of some function that that trait satisfies. 
The claim has been made that although functional explanation 
is a perfectly acceptable method of explanation of many of 
the activities of living organisms, yet this sort of explana-
tion (since the abandonment of Aristotelian physics) is not 
derivable from explanation of non-organic physical activities. 
Thus, if there is an acceptable mode of explanation for organic 
phenomena which does not apply to non-organic phenomena, 
then this fact should pose a barrier to attempts to work out 
the reduction of all biology to physics. What evidence can we 
Point to in favor of this claim? 
Consider the standard model of scientific reduction 
(Nagel, 1963). Roughly, one theory is shown to be reduced 
to another if (1) all the terms of the theory to be reduced 
can be defined (correlated) with terms of the reducing theory, 
and (2) all the laws of the theory to be reduced can be derived, 
by means of these definitions, from the laws of the reducing 
theory. I will be concerned here only with the first require-
ment. For, obviously, if the first requirement cannot be met, 
there is no point in worrying about the second. 
The particular term that I wish to consider is the term 
'function' as it occurs in sentences such as, "The function of 
the heartbeat in mammals is to circulate the blood." As has 
been noted many times, the term 'function' has many dif-
ferent uses. I shall here be concerned only with what we might 
call the 'natural function attribution' sense of the term. That 
is, I wish to discuss that sense of 'function' which we use when 
we attribute a function to some biological item. 
Here it might be objected that what is at stake is not the 
reducibility of biology to chemico-physics but rather the 
reducibility of function-attributions and functional-explana-
tion. But if the term 'function' naturally occurs in biological 
discourse, as one would suppose it must in discussions of 
physiology, surely this term needs to be accounted for if one 
is really to reduce biology without remainder to physics and 
chemistry. (See for example, recent standard biological texts 
such as Curtis, 1975 and Weiss, 1971.) 
A number of philosophers have thought functional-
explanation a suspect form of explanation and have attempted 
to reduce it to some other sort of non-teleological explanation. 
In this paper I shall consider some attempts to reduce func-
tional explanation to causal explanation. By a causal explana-
tion I mean an account of the occurrence of some phenom-
enon which appeals to its causes. Such accounts typically 
include statements of laws of nature which express causal 
regularities. I shall concentrate on the attempt to reduce talk 
of functions to talk of causes. If this can be accomplished, 
then we would have no reason to suppose that a separate form 
149 
of explanation need be involved in accounting for the activi-
ties of parts of organisms to which functions are naturally 
attributed. The task of the proponent of the causal reduction 
of functional explanation is to show how the following func-
tion-attribution schema can be accounted for in strictly causal 
terms: 
(F) The function of X is Y. 
One might try to hold that (F) comes to no more than 
(G) X is causally sufficient for Y. 
One might try to support this by noting, in terms of the above 
example, that the beating of the heart in mammals is causally 
sufficient for the circulation of the blood. However, a little 
reflection reveals that a more cautious claim needs to be made 
here, namely: 
(H) X usually causes Y. 
For, with respect to our example, the beating of the heart will 
not result in the circulation of the blood unless the heart is 
properly connected with the rest of the body (is, for example, 
not resting by itself in a saline solution). But (H) by itself will 
not do. One traditional counter-example to this sort of ac-
count is that, whereas the beating of the heart usually causes 
heart sounds, it is not (we assume) a function of the beating 
of the heart to produce heart-sounds. Thus, (H) is too broad 
to be an adequate analysis of (F). 
Another attempt at reducing function-attributions in-
volves construing them as causally necessary conditions for 
some state-of-affairs. Thus, one might propose that (F) comes 
to no more than: 
(I) X is a causally necessary condition for Y. 
Modifying our example to (I), we might claim that the beating 
of the heart is a causally necessary condition for the circula-
tion of the blood. Here again, there is a traditional counter-
example. For the existence of artificial heart-machines which 
make possible the circulation of the blood demonstrates that 
the beating of the mammalian heart is not causally necessary 
for hlood circulation. Therefore, (I) is too restrictive to be an 
adequate analysis of (F). 
One might try to salvage the strategy behind (1) by noting 
that one only attributes functions to items that are parts of 
some natural system (Gruner, 1965). Thus we may attempt to 
accommodate (F) as: 
(J) In system S, X is causally necessary for Y. 
Thus, if we let She thc nornuzl mammal, then we may avoid 
the problem that heart-machines raised for (l). However, (1) 
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still does not give us an adequate analysis of (F). (J) is to 
liberal an account, as it cannot handle the problem of heart~ 
sounds raised earlier. For, although in the normal mamrn I 
the beating of the heart is causally necessary for ·the produa 
tion of heart-sounds, this production is not a function of t;' 
beating of the heart. Furthermore, (1) is also too restrictive 
an analysis. Part of an organism (for example, the right kidne e 
in a human) can have a function (to purify the blOod of i~ 
purities) without that item being naturally causally necessary 
for satisfying the function (after all, we can get by with only 
one kidney). 
Let us grant, therefore, that neither appeals to causal 
necessity nor causal sufficiency will work. Yet we should not 
I think, be tempted to suppose that function-attributions d~ 
not involve causation at all. We may certainly grant that (F) 
does entail: 
(K) In system S, X typically contributes 
causally to Y. 
Even if (K) does not give us a reductive analysis of (F) (for 
example, it cannot handle the problem of the heart-sounds), 
it is still important to note that in attributing a function to an 
item we are also asserting that there clearly is a causal con. 
tribution relationship between the elements in question. For 
example, if the beating of the heart did not typically contrib. 
ute causally to the circulation of the blood in normal mam. 
mals, we would not be inclined to attribute the function of 
circulating the blood to the beating of the heart. 
At this point we might be tempted to modify (K). Let us 
note that what seems to be problematic about the case of 
heart-sounds is that the production of heart-sounds by the 
beating of the heart seems not to contribute naturally to any 
goal of the normal mammal. With this in mind we might then 
try to modify (K) as follows: 
(L) In S, X causally contributes to Y and Y is some 
goal, G, of S, or Y contributes causally to G. 
(L) does allow us to distinguish between the spurious heart· 
sounds case and our paradigm example of blood circulation. 
However, (L) is not all that happy a result. For althoughil 
does not contain the term 'function,' it nonetheless does make 
use of a concept which is just as teleological, namely the 
concept of a goal. Thus, in order to carry out the present 
project it seems that a reductive non-teleological analysis 
needs to be provided for the concept of a goal. 
While I doubt that such an analysis can be given, I will 
offer no specific arguments to that effect here. (For further 
discussion of these and further attempts to reduce function' 
attributes, see Nissen. 1971. Compare also, Bunge, 1963.) 
What I wish to present here is a theory as to why the above 
reductions faiJ. r suggest that there is a kind of irreducible 
"directedness" in function-attributions which is responsible 
for the failure of the above attempts at analysis. This notion of 
. reducible directed ness is, admittedly, rather vague. To make 
1: somewhat more precise, let us consider an analogous phe-
\omenon in the philosophy of mind. In discussing the ques-
~ion of whether or not there is a unique characteristic of 
mental phenomena, Franz Brentano held that every mental 
henomenon had the property of being directed upon an ~bject which need not exist (Brentano, 1973). The property of 
being directed upon an object which need not exist, or, as it 
is presently known, of intentionality, does seem to be a char-
acteristic of a group of mental phenomena called propositional-
attitudes. (These include such phenomena as believing, know-
ing, desiring, hoping, despising, fearing, etc.) To motivate 
this notion of being directed upon an object which need not 
exist, consider the sentence: 
(M) Smith believes that Zorinsky is prudent. 
smith's belief, we may say, is directed on Zorinsky. But the 
truth of (M) surely does not imply that Zorinsky exists. For 
note the sentence: 
(N) Smith believes that Santa Claus is benevolent. 
Various formal criteria have been proposed to capture Bren-
tano's intuition that there is some distinctive feature of psy-
chological attitudes (Manas, 1972). 
It is not my purpose here to explore the question of 
whether there is an adequate criterion of this feature of in-
tentionality. Instead, what I do wish to point out is that it 
has proved most difficult to reduce causal claims about ex-
ternal behavior and internal states. Some have held that it is 
the intentionality of propositional-attitudes which is responsi-
ble for this. What I wish to suggest here is that, similarly, it is 
a sort of intentionality, or directedness on a state-of-affairs 
or condition which need not exist, which is responsible for the 
failure of the above attempt to reduce natural function state-
ments to statements of causal relations. 
To support this contention, let us consider, for example, 
the following, which has been proposed as a criterion of the 
intentionality of propositional attitudes: 
(C l ) A [further] mark of intentionality may be de-
scribed in this way. Suppose there are two names 
or descriptions which designate the same things 
and that E is a sentence obtained merely by 
separating these two names or descriptions by 
means of "is (are) identical with." Suppose also 
that A is a sentence using one of those names or 
descriptions and that B is like A, except that, 
where A uses the one, B uses the other. Let us 
say that S is intentional if the conjunction of 
A and E does not imply B (Chisholm, 1957). 
Note that this neatly fits our belief sentence (M). For con-
sider: 
(M) Smith believes that Zorinsky is prudent. 
(0) Zorinsky = Nebraska's senior senator. 
(P) Smith believes that Nebraska's senior senator is 
prudent. 
From (M) and (0) we cannot deduce (P). This criterion also 
seems to fit our function-attribution sentence: 
(Q) The function of heart beating in mammals is to 
promote the circulation of the blood. 
(R) The circulation of the blood is the activity most 
commonly used as a philosophical example of a 
biological activity. 
(S) The function of heart beating in mammals is to 
promote the activity commonly used as a philo-
sophical example of biological activity. 
From (Q) and (R) it seems that we cannot deduce (S). But 
consider a causal case: 
(T) Heart beating causes heart noises. 
(U) Heart noises are my favorite noises. 
(V) Heart beating causes my favorite noises. 
In this case it is clear that the inference from (T) and (U) to 
(V) certainly goes through. 
To strengthen my argument, let us consider another 
rough criterion of in tentionaJity (or "directedness"): 
(C2) A sentence expressing a dyadic-relation (a rela-
tion between two elements) is intentional if the 
truth of the sentence and the existence of either 
element of the relation does not entail the exis-
tence of the other element of the relation. 
Let us apply this criterion to our examples. First, with respect 
to belief; the truth of (M) and existence of Smith doesn't 
entail existence of Zorinsky. Second, with respect to function-
attributions, the truth of (Q) and existence of a heart-beating 
doesn't entail existence of a blood-circulation. But, third, with 
respect to causal-attribution, the truth of (T) and existence of 
heart-beating does entail existence of heart noises. 
Thus we have two criteria of intentionality which apply 
to both propositional-attitudes and function-attributions but 
not to the attribution of causes. What I hope to have suggested 
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here, then, is that there are certain properties which are such 
that: (1) propositional-attitude sentences and function-attribu-
tion sentences share them, (2) causal-attributions lack them, 
and (3) these properties intuitively are expressed in the phrase 
"directed on an object or state-of-affairs which need not 
exist. " 
What follows from this? Certain philosophers have held 
that persons are best to be understood as a sort of thing with 
two different sorts of properties, (1) purely causal physical 
properties, and (2) psychological properties, arguing this on 
the grounds that the latter sort of property cannot be reduced 
to the former. Some biologists also hold that organisms are 
best understood as a sort of thing with two different sorts 
of properties: purely causal physical properties, and func-
tional properties. I have tried to consider here a sort of argu-
ment to support this latter view, which also unifies it with 
the former. 
In response to my remarks someone might argue that a 
dual-properties view, such as I suggest, need not be accepted 
because teleology is an anthropomorphic concept (Simon, 
1968). The proper reply, I think, to this remark is that we 
should not take the denial of the dual-properties position 
seriously until we can produce either a reductive account of 
teleological notions, like function, or a convincing reason 
that these teleological concepts can be dispensed with. And 
both of these tasks, it seems to me, remain to be done. 
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